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Abstract
We provide a revealed preference analysis of the rational addiction model. The
revealed preference approach avoids the need to impose an, a priori unveriable,
functional form on the underlying utility function. Our results extend the previously
established revealed preference characterizations for the life cycle model and the one-
lag habits model. We show that our characterization is easily testable by means of
linear programming methods and we demonstrate its practical usefulness by means
of an application to Spanish household consumption data.
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1 Motivation
This paper develops a revealed preference approach to verify consistency with the widely
known rational addiction model from Becker and Murphy (1988). At a theoretical level, we
establish revealed preference conditions such that a data set is consistent with the model
of rational addiction. This characterization is entirely nonparametric, which makes the
model robust with respect to specication errors. Further, we demonstrate that our results
generalize the revealed preference characterization for the life cycle model, as given by
Browning (1989), and the revealed preference characterization of the one-lag habits model,
from Crawford (2010). At a practical level, we show that our restrictions can be veried
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1using elementary linear programming techniques. An application to a data set drawn from
the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (a Spanish household budget survey)
demonstrates the empirical relevance of our results.
The rational addiction model The rational addiction model of Becker and Murphy
(1988) oers an economic rationale for the seemingly inconsistent behavior of addictive
consumption. Not only does the model demonstrate how a genuinely rational individual
can become addicted, it also captures and explains related behavior of addicts such as
cold turkey and binges. The model of rational addiction draws on the literature of rational
habit formation (e.g. Pollak, 1970, Spinnewyn, 1981) and approaches addictive behavior as
resulting of a rational choice process. The consumer maximizes his lifetime utility, taking
into account all future consequences of current and past consumption of addictive goods.
The model of Becker and Murphy (1988) incorporates the intertemporal aspect of addiction
by dening a `stock of addiction' variable that enters the instantaneous utility function; the
consumer is, as it were, investing in a stock of addictive substances. This stock of addiction
depreciates over time at a constant rate but it also increases by consumption of the addictive
good. This `consumption capital' approach results in interesting interdependencies in the
consumption stream.
The empirical validation of the rational addiction model has been initiated by Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy (1994) who use the theoretical predictions of the rational addiction
model to estimate the demand for cigarettes. In particular, they estimate the demand
for cigarettes as a linear function of past, current and future prices and past and future
consumption. It is this last feature that distinguishes addictive consumption from regular,
nonaddictive consumption. Unlike regular commodities, the purchase of cigarettes today
depends on past consumption as well as on expected future consumption. Most empirical
research since then has followed the same empirical framework. The rational addiction
model has been veried for various commodities (alcohol, cocaine, caeine,...) and activities
(gambling, cinema, eating,...).1 As stressed by Ferguson (2000), most of the key theoretical
predictions of the rational addiction model appear to have been conrmed empirically
virtually every time they have been tested.
However, the framework of Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) also poses some
diculties. Baltagi (2007) discusses the possible econometric problems when estimating
the intertemporal demand equations, and Auld and Grootendorst (2004) demonstrate that
most tests of the rational addiction models tend to yield spurious evidence in favor of
the model when serially correlated aggregate data is used.2 This spurious evidence would
1See, for example, Chaloupka (1991); Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994); Connie (1995); Labeaga
(1999); Baltagi and Grin (2001); Escario and Molina (2001); Fenn, Antonovitz, and Schroeter (2001);
Bask and Melkersson (2003); Wan (2006) and Laporte, Karimova, and Ferguson (2010) for the case of
cigarettes, Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1998); Bentzen, Eriksson, and Smith (1999); Baltagi and
Grin (2002) and Williams (2005) for alcohol, Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) for the case of cocaine,
Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) for caeine and Cameron (1999); Yamamura (2009); Sisto and Zanola (2010)
for addictive behavior relating to activities, such as cinema.
2This serial correlation would also explain their nding that apparently nonaddictive goods, such as
2also explain why in many researches, estimates of the subjective discount rate are either
implausibly high or implausibly low, or even negative.3 Moreover, it should also be stated
that the underlying structural assumptions that are imposed in order to derive the partic-
ular linear functional form for the demand equation are quite strong. In particular, Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy (1994) assume that all nonaddictive goods can be aggregated into
a numeraire good (such that one can restrict the analysis to a partial demand system),
that the utility function is quadratic, that there are no credit constraints or capital mar-
ket imperfections, that the subjective discount rate equals the interest rate and that the
depreciation rate of the addiction stock is equal to unity. These assumptions are quite
strong and, when imposed simultaneously, create a very restrictive framework for testing
the rational addiction model.
The revealed preference approach In this paper, we circumvent the need to impose
these restrictive (and often unveriable) assumptions by employing the revealed preference
methodology. This approach, which was introduced by Samuelson (1948), Houthakker
(1950), Afriat (1967, 1973) and Varian (1982), allows to test for the existence of a well-
behaved utility function that is compatible with observed (addictive) consumer behavior
without the need to impose any functional structure on preferences. In this way, we are
able to obtain an exact test of the rational addiction model. To our knowledge, there
are only two previous researches that apply the revealed preference methodology to an
intertemporal decision context. First, Browning (1989) considers the basic life cycle model
under the assumptions of perfect foresight and perfect capital markets. Hence, consumers
can lend and borrow at the same interest rate as they please, implying perfect consumption
smoothing over time. Furthermore, he also assumes consumption independence, implying
that the instantaneous utility in any given period depends only on the consumed bundle in
this period. As such, this life cycle model is too restrictive to capture addictive behavior.
An important extension to this basic setting is given by Crawford (2010), who relaxes the
assumption of consumption independence so as to take into account habit formation. The
main idea behind habit formation is that past consumption of certain goods (the so-called
habit goods) can have persisting eects on utility. In other words, the consumption of a
habit good in a certain period will aect the instantaneous utility in (a nite number of)
future periods.
Although the rational addiction model and the habits model are more or less similar
in spirit, they dier in some crucial respects. The main distinguishing feature between the
two models is the way in which past consumption of the addictive good changes the future
utility. As mentioned above, the rational addiction model assumes that past consumption
in
uences future utility through a stock of addiction. The way this stock is formed is
very similar to an investment problem. Current and past consumption increase the future
stock while in every time period, the stock is depreciated at a xed rate. In this way,
current consumption potentially in
uences the utility of all future periods. On the other
milk, are found to be more addictive than cigarettes.
3See Auld and Grootendorst (2004, table 1) for an overview of this fact.
3hand, in the habits model current utility is a function of current consumption and of past
consumption of the addictive good for a nite number of lagged periods. In the special
case of the one-lag habits model, i.e. the model where the instantaneous utility function
only depends on current consumption and on the consumption of the addictive good of one
lagged period, the habits model reduces to a special case of the rational addiction model.
However, if the utility function depends on the consumption of more than one lagged
period, then the habits model and the rational addiction model are generally unrelated,
i.e. they are independent or non-nested.
Overview In Section 2, we present the rational addiction model as a general intertem-
poral budget allocation problem. We shall brie
y discuss the conditions under which the
habits model and the life cycle model coincide with the rational addiction model. Further-
more, we show how it is possible to relax the assumption of perfect capital markets by
considering the case where households are constrained in the amount of money they can
transfer (borrow) between periods. In the nal part of this section, we derive the revealed
preference characterization of the rational addiction model and we show that the revealed
preference conditions for the one-lag habits model and the life cycle model can be obtained
as special cases.
In Section 3, we apply our revealed preference conditions to a real life data set. All tests
were conducted from a micro data set drawn from the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos
Familiares (ECPF). By applying our test on each individual household separately, our
results fully take into account interhousehold heterogeneity. Our results suggest that the
rational addiction model provides a better rationalization than the one-lag habits model
and the life-cycle model in the case of perfect capital markets. More specically, we support
the value of the rational addiction model in terms of improved predictive success compared
to alternative models.
Section 4 concludes the paper and hints at future research. The proofs are in the
appendix.
2 Testable implications of the rational addiction model
In this section, we present the rational addiction model as introduced in the seminal contri-
bution of Becker and Murphy (1988). Here, in order to keep the notation and the analysis
simple, we focus on the case of a single addictive good. Extensions to more than a single
addictive good are presented at the end of section 3. Subsection 2.1 presents the rational
addiction framework and denes when a data set is consistent with this model. Subsection
2.2 shows how the rational addiction model generalizes the life cycle model and the one-lag
habits model. Finally, subsection 2.3 presents the revealed preference characterization of
the rational addiction model.
42.1 The rational addiction model
Consider an individual (or household) who consumes in each period t 2 N a vector qt 2 RK
+
of nonaddictive goods at prices pt 2 RK
++ and an amount Qt 2 R+ of an addictive good
at price Pt 2 R++.4 We assume that our consumer receives in each period t an exogenous
income Yt 2 R+, which can be more or less than the consumption expenditure for this
period. If consumption in period t amounts to less than Yt, the dierence is added to
savings, which yield a net return of rt between period t and t + 1. If current income Yt is
insucient to purchase the demanded bundle, the decit is borrowed at the same interest
rate, with the additional constraint that the borrowed amount in period t cannot exceed
some upper limit bt (i.e. we allow for imperfect capital markets). If we denote total savings
in period t by St, this implies that St   bt. Note that there is no need for the value of
bt to be identical for dierent consumers. The special case without credit constraints is
obtained by setting bt suciently high for all periods t. The budget constraint for period
t > 1 is then determined by the following intertemporal budget constraint.
ptqt + PtQt + St = Yt + (1 + rt 1)St 1
We take initial savings as given; S0  S0. Then, given the consumption quantities, the
prices, the income stream and the interest rates, we have that St is fully determined for all
t.
We denote by At, the addictive stock that has been built up by the past consumption
of the addictive good (i.e. Q1;:::;Qt 1). In particular, the rational addiction model posits
the existence of a depreciation rate,  2]0;1] which measures how fast the physical and
psychological eects of past consumption of the addictive good decrease over time. In each
time period t  2, the addictive stock is then determined by the following function.
At = (1   )At 1 + Qt 1:
If  2]0;1[, the eects of past consumption decrease progressively as time proceeds. This
becomes more obvious if we solve the linear function recursively.






Observe that we exclude the case where  = 0, since this would imply the eects of
past consumption would never wear o (i.e. At could never decrease after once consuming
the addictive good). Evidently, such case would rule out so-called 'cold turkey' behavior,
which is often observed with addicts who try to get rid of their addiction by quitting their
consumption of the addictive good until the physical and psychological eects have worn
o over time.
4We remark that the innite horizon formulation is not crucial. In fact, assuming a nite time horizon
would lead to the same revealed preference conditions.
5Let u(qt;Qt;At) : R
K+2
+ ! R+ represent the instantaneous utility function of the
consumer. We assume that u is strictly increasing in qt and Qt, continuous and concave in
all its arguments. The addictive commodity can either be detrimental for the individual,
such as tobacco or alcohol, but can also be benecial, such as healthy leisure expenditures
for practicing sports. If the addictive good is detrimental, then u should be decreasing in
At.5 Finally, the rational addiction model assumes that the consumer is endowed with a
subjective discount factor, which we represent by  2]0;1].
Following Browning (1989) and Crawford (2010), we maintain the assumption that
there is perfect foresight concerning future prices, incomes and interest rates. By putting
everything together, the agent chooses his optimal consumption path by solving the fol-








s.t. for all t  1
ptqt + PtQt + St = Yt + (1 + rt 1)St 1;
At+1 = (1   )At + Qt;
St   bt; and,
S0 = S0; A1 = A1:
The optimization program OP-RA requires that the consumer takes all future conse-
quences of her addiction (e.g. utility losses due to illness or depression, craving or with-
drawal caused by past consumption of harmful substances) into account when deciding
on her optimal consumption path. This is the main assumption that makes the rational
addiction model dierent from other models of (irrational) addictive behavior.












=  (1   )t+1 + t 8t  1; (A.3)
t+1(1 + rt)  t 8t  1; (A.4)
At+1 = (1   )At + Qt 8t  1: (A.5)
Condition (A.1) presents the rst order conditions for the private goods qt, where t
is the Lagrange multiplier for the intertemporal budget constraint. Condition (A.2) gives
5For a benecial addictive good, we would have that u is increasing in At.
6We omit the necessary transversality conditions as they do not really matter for the remaining part
of this paper.
6the rst order condition for the addictive good. The additional term t on the right hand
side, which is positive for a harmful addictive good (and negative for a benecial addictive
good), gives the marginal eect of Qt on lifetime utility due to the increase in the stock of
addiction. It is the Lagrange multiplier for the stock of addiction equation. In particular,
t measures the marginal decrease in (future) lifetime utility due to a marginal increase
in the stock of addiction At+1. Given that t > 0, we see that the consumer will have a
lower consumption of the harmful addictive good compared to the case where she does not
take this negative eect into account. Condition (A.3) decomposes this marginal (future)
welfare loss t into two components. The rst component,  t 1 @u(qt;Qt;At)/@A, is the
negative welfare eect on the instantaneous utility u(qt+1;Qt+1;At+1) due to an increase
in At+1. The second component, (1   )t+1, gives the marginal future welfare loss due
to the increase in the future stock of addiction At+1 (caused by the increase in At). Next,
condition (A.4) gives the intertemporal optimality condition corresponding to the amount
of savings St. Notice that condition (A.4) holds with equality only if there is no liquidity
constraint at period t, i.e. when St >  bt. Finally, condition (A.5) gives the dynamic
equation that determines the stock of addiction.
In order to enhance the intuition behind the two key conditions (A.2) and (A.3), we














The variable e P
Q
t gives the discounted marginal utility of an increase in the consumption
of the addictive good, Qt. The variable e P A
t gives the discounted marginal cost of an increase




t+1 = (1   )(e P
Q
t+1   t+1Pt+1)   (e P
Q
t   tPt) (1)
This condition can be solved recursively to obtain the following equilibrium condition.
e P
Q







This condition provides the equilibrium condition for an addicted consumer in her choice
of the optimal quantity of Qt. If good Q were not addictive, then the right hand side of
this equation would be equal to tPt. In other words, for a regular good, rational behavior
requires that the marginal benet of an additional unit of Qt must be equal to its marginal
cost. This marginal cost is equal to the marginal utility of income, given by t, times
the prevailing price Pt. However, in case of detrimental addiction, the rational consumer
should also take into account all future costs incurred by this marginal increase in Qt. This
7additional cost is equal to the utility loss from the increase in all future stocks of addiction
(At+1;:::) caused by this increase in Qt.
Now, in real life it is impossible to observe the entire stream of consumption bundles. On
the other hand we only have a subsample of this stream. In particular, our framework
assumes that we observe a nite set of interest rates, prices and consumed quantities
D = f(rt;pt;Pt;qt;Qt)gtT. We follow Browning (1989) and Crawford (2010) and dene
rationalizability of a data set in terms of its consistency with respect to the rst order
conditions.
Denition 1 (Rationalizability). The data set D = frt;pt;Pt;qt;QtgtT is rationalizable
(or consistent with the rational addiction model) if and only if there exist a well-behaved
(sub)dierentiable utility function u, numbers ; 2]0;1], and for all t  T, there exist
numbers t;t > 0 and At  0 such that such that conditions (A.1)-(A.5) are satised.
Above denition states that a data set is consistent with the model of rational addiction
if there exist a well-behaved instantaneous utility function that satises the derived rst
order conditions. In other words, the data set is rationalizable if we can nd a utility
function which provides a perfect within-sample t of the observed consumption data.
2.2 Two special cases
The rational addiction model generalizes both the life cycle model and the one-lag habits
model. In particular, if the savings constraint is never binding (i.e. if St >  bt for all t)
and if there is full depreciation, i.e.  = 1, then the model reduces to the one-lag habits
model as presented by Crawford (2010). In this case, the instantaneous utility function













= t 8t  1; (B.3)
t+1(1 + rt) = t 8t  1: (B.4)
In this setting, our denition of rationalizability (Denition 1) coincides with Denition 1
of Crawford (2010).
If we further assume that the instantaneous utility function is independent of At, i.e.
u(qt;Qt;At)  u(qt;Qt), then the rational addiction model reduces to the life cycle model
whose revealed preference conditions are given by Browning (1989). Indeed, in this case,
there are no addictive goods and condition (A.3) implies that t = 0 for all t > 0. As such,








= tPt 8t  1; (C.2)
t+1(1 + rt) = t 8t  1: (C.4)
For this life cycle model, Denition 1 above coincides with the one provided by Browning
(1989), who moreover assumed that beta equals one.
2.3 Revealed preference characterization
We are now ready to provide the revealed preference conditions that characterize the
collection of data sets that are consistent with the rational addiction model. The proof is
in the appendix.
Theorem 1. Consider a data set D = frt;pt;Pt;qt;Qtgt=1;:::;T. The following conditions
are equivalent:
 The data set D is rationalizable by the rational addiction model.
 For all t  T, there exist positive numbers ut and At, strictly positive numbers t
and e P
Q
t , a negative number e P A
t and numbers ; 2]0;1], such that for all v;t  T:




vpv (qt   qv) + e P
Q
v (Qt   Qv) + e P
A





t+1 = (1   )(e P
Q
t+1   t+1Pt+1)   (e P
Q
t   tPt); (G.2)
t+1(1 + rt)  t; (G.3)
At+1 = (1   )At + Qt: (G.4)
Condition (G.1) is a generalization of the Afriat inequalities for this intertemporal
setting. Condition (G.2) is an immediate translation of condition (1). Finally conditions
(G.3) and (G.4) are obtained from conditions (A.4) and (A.5). It is interesting to note
that by replacing the inequality in condition (G.3) with an equality, we can test whether
the data is consistent with a model without credit constraints. In fact, in the empirical
section, we will make a distinction between the model where the borrowing constraints are
possibly binding, i.e. where (G.4) holds with weak inequality and the case where these
constraints are not binding, i.e. where (G.4) holds with equality. Also, if we would like to
obtain revealed preference conditions for the case where the addictive good is benecial, it
suces to impose that ~ P A
t is positive for all t.
Let us now have a look at the two special cases considered in the previous section.
For the one-lag habits model, the stock At coincides with the consumption Qt 1. Fur-
ther, the model imposes that the depreciation rate  equals one and that there are no
9binding borrowing constraints. As such, we obtain the following set of revealed preference
conditions.




vpv (qt   qv) + e P
Q
v (Qt   Qv) + e P
A
v (Qt 1   Qv 1)
i
(G.5)
tPt = e P
A
t+1 + e P
Q
t (G.6)
t+1(1 + rt) = t (G.7)
If we relax (G.7) to condition (G.3) we can account for possible binding borrowing con-
straints in the one-lag habits model.
Finally, for the life cycle model, it holds that the instantaneous utility function is
independent of At, which imposes that e P A
t = 0 for all t. For this case, the revealed
preference conditions are the following.
ut   uv 
v
v 1 [pv (qt   qv) + Pv (Qt   Qv)] (G.8)
t+1(1 + rt) = t (G.9)
Again, if we replace condition (G.9) with (G.3) we can allow for binding credit constraints.
3 Empirical application
In this section, we illustrate our revealed preference results by applying it to a data set
drawn from the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares. Subsection 3.1 discusses
the methodology employed to verify the revealed preference conditions. In subsection 3.2,
we present our results.
3.1 Verication
The set of revealed preference conditions (G.1)-(G.4) is highly nonlinear, and therefore,
dicult to verify. In order to manage this problem we proceed by conducting a grid search
on the values of  and . Since these values are restricted to lie in the interval ]0;1], a grid
search on these parameters can be done quite eciently. In practice, we consider 6 equally
spaced values for  between 0:95 and 1 ( = 0:95;0:96;:::;1), and 10 equally spaced values
of  between 0:1 and 1 ( = 0:1;0:2;:::;1). This provides us with 60 possible combinations
of  and ).7
Now, keeping the values of  and  xed, we see that only condition (G.1) remains
nonlinear, where the variables At and Av interact with the variable e P A
v . This nonlinearity
can be resolved by xing a value for the initial stock of addiction, i.e. A1. Indeed, given
7The considered values of  are quite high because our application deals with quarterly data. We
performed several robustness results by considering other ranges for the grid search. Because these did
not signicantly change our results, we abstain from presenting these results. However, outcomes for these
alternative scenarios are available upon request.
10the value of A1, we can use condition (G.4) and the known value of  to compute all values
of At. In order to obtain a plausible value for this initial stock, we can make dierent
assumptions. One particulary attractive option is to assume that at period 1, the agent
has already a stock of addiction which is close to its long run steady state, i.e. A1  A2.8
This implies that,





As such, we may approximate A1 by Q1/.9
The rational addiction model, the one lag habits model and the life cycle model both
with or without possible binding borrowing constraints provide us with 6 possible models
to test. For completeness, we consider one additional seventh model that is frequently
used in revealed preference analysis, namely the static optimization model (see Afriat
(1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982)). In this model it is assumed that the individual
optimizes her static utility function subject to the current period budget constraint. This
model coincides with the life cycle model if there is no monetary transfer between periods,
i.e. no borrowing or saving. Expressing this properties in terms of Afriat inequalities gives
that the following set of conditions must hold for some nonnegative numbers ut and strict
positive numbers t for all t;v  T.
ut   uv  v [pv(qt   qv) + Pv(Qt   Qv)]:
Observe that these Afriat condition coincide with the testable implications for the life cycle
model if condition (G.9) is dropped.
Although we consider seven distinct models, several of these models are empirically
nested. For example, if a data set is consistent with the life cycle model without binding
borrowing constraints, then it will be consistent with all other models. The specic nature
by which the models are nested is illustrated in Figure 1 where the arrows point in the
direction of weaker testable implications.
3.2 Application
Our empirical illustration uses the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares. This
data set contains detailed information on consumed quantities and prices for a large sam-
ple of households. We refer to Browning and Collado (2001) and Crawford (2010) for a
more detailed explanation of this data set. The data range from 1985 until 1997 and are
gathered on a quarterly basis. Every new quarter, new households are participating in the
8The problem of determining the initial stock of addiction is similar to the economic problem of esti-
mating the initial stock of capital for a given stream of investments. In this sense, our approach is a direct
translation of the procedure introduced by Harberger (1978) to the rational addiction setting.
9We performed some robustness checks by varying the value of A1 around the steady state. This did
not signicantly change our results.
11Figure 1: Logical implication for data consistency with the dierent models
Static







moving panel and others are dropped, with a maximum of eight consecutive observations
per household. We consider the following 14 nondurable commodity categories: (1) Food
and non-alcoholic drinks at home, (2) Alcohol, (3) Tobacco, (4) Energy at home, (5) Ser-
vices at home, (6) Nondurables at home, (7) Nondurable medicines, (8) Medical services,
(9) Transportation, (10) Petrol, (11) Leisure, (12) Personal services, (13) Personal non-
durables, (14) Restaurants and bars. We take tobacco to be the addictive good and, for
matters of comparability of empirical results, we will only focus on the subset of house-
holds for which we have observations for all eight quarters and which have strict positive
consumption for the addictive good in all periods. This procedure still leaves a sizeable
sample of 671 households. Since tobacco is a detrimental good, which implies that e P A
t
takes only negative values.
Table 1 contains the goodness-of-t results (i.e. the pass rates), given by the percentage
of households that pass the revealed preference tests for the seven models under consider-
ation. The static model ts the data relatively well, and evidently yields the same results
whether we allow for binding borrowing constraints or not. On the contrary, the life cycle
model is heavily rejected, which is not surprising given the strong underlying assumptions
for this model. By allowing that tobacco consumption has lasting utility eects that persist
for one period (i.e. the one-lag habits model), we are able to attain a reasonable goodness-
of-t of 0:75, but only if we simultaneously relax the assumption that there are no binding
borrowing constraints. If we further relax the conditions towards the rational addiction
model, we see that the model can rationalize almost all observed behavior, given that we
allow for binding borrowing constraints. Compared to the one-lag habits model, the as-
sumption of perfect capital markets appears to be less strong for the rational addiction
model, as the pass rate still remains reasonably high if we assume perfect capital markets
(around 0:4). Of course, due to the nestedness of the dierent models, it should come as
no surprise that the rational addiction model outperforms the more restrictive life cycle
and habits models.
In order to account for this nestedness of the dierent models it is crucial to perform a
power analysis. The power of a model is dened as the probability of rejecting the model
when this model is not the true data generating process. In particular, we compute the
power as the probability that our conditions reject seemingly irrational (or random) behav-
ior. Towards this end, we consider a bootstrap procedure. For each household we simulate
1000 random series of eight consumption choices by constructing, for each of the eight ob-
served household expenditures, a random quantity bundle that exhausts this budget. We
12Table 1: Pass rates and power










credit constrained 0.896 0.297 0.083
construct these quantity bundles by randomly drawing (with replacement) budget shares
(for the 14 goods) from the set of 5368 (=8 x 671) observed household choices in our data
set. The power measure is then obtained as one minus the proportion of these randomly
generated consumption streams that are consistent with the rationalizability condition un-
der evaluation. By using this bootstrap method, our power assessment gives information
on the expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating in-
formation on the households' actual choices.10 Table 1 contains for every model under
consideration the average power over all households. Our results show that the rational
addiction model has lower power than the nested habits and life cycle specications. Again
this is a consequence of the nestedness of the dierent models. Nevertheless, the rational
addiction model with perfect capital markets still rejects (on average) almost three quarters
of all simulated consumption streams.
Arguably, these numbers only give a concise presentation of the empirical performance
of each behavioral model. We present two approaches that may yield more insights into
the underlying structure of each model, improving our ability to assess and rate models
in a more coherent manner. The rst approach is to look at the entire distribution of the
household-specic power estimates, which will show us much more than the simple mean
in Table 1. The second approach will reconcile the empirical performance in terms of pass
rates and power into a single measure, which is convenient for directly comparing dierent
models in terms of overall empirical performance.
Table 2 presents the quartiles of the power distribution for our sample of households,
for each considered model. For completeness, we repeat pass rates as stated in Table
1. For most models, the power distribution appears to be rather dense and more or less
symmetric. Figure 2 presents the kernel densities of the power distribution for the rational
addiction, the one lag habit and the life cycle models where there are no credit constraints
and Figure 3 does the same for the models with possible credit constraints. These give a
more detailed overview of how much the discriminatory power of each model varies between
0 and 1. Since the models in each graph are nested, we can expect the most general model
10We refer to Bronars (1987) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) for a general discussion on alternative
procedures to evaluate power in the context of revealed preference tests such as ours.
13Table 2: Power distribution
pass rates power
Min 1st quart. median 3rd quart. max
static 0.915 0 0.003 0.0570 0.206 0.675
life cycle
credit constrained 0.124 0 0.871 0.936 0.966 0.999
no credit constraints 0 0.966 1 1 1 1
one-lag habits
credit constrained 0.754 0 0.132 0.281 0.443 0.876
no credit constraints 0.022 0.428 0.961 0.977 0.988 1
rational addiction
credit constrained 0.951 0 0.018 0.055 0.122 0.533
no credit constraints 0.41 0.045 0.685 0.767 0.817 0.984
(i.e. the rational addiction model) to have generally lower power and have a kernel density
with higher weight to the left in comparison to the habits model, which is in turn expected
to have higher weight at lower values than the restrictive life cycle model. These notions are
already to some extent conrmed by looking at the quartile values in Table 2, and become
even more apparent when looking at Figures 2 and 3. The life cycle model typically has
a high density at power levels very close to 1, combined with a small variance. On the
contrary, the more general rational addiction model has a density peak at lower power
values, with power estimates much more dispersed for dierent households. The habits
model has signicant power in the case of perfect capital markets, but much lower and
more dispersed power if borrowing constraints are not excluded.11 These results broadly
conrm the basic nding from Table 1, which is that models with high goodness-of-t (i.e.
pass rate) typically suer from low power and vice versa.
Figure 2 around here.
Figure 3 around here.
Predictive success Up to now, we have focused our empirical assessment on the pass
rates and discriminatory power of the various models. How can we reconcile both (often
inversely related) performance measures into a single index, such that they can be used
as a reliable criterion for comparing dierent but possibly nested models? To address this
issue, Selten (1991) introduces a measure of predictive success as an interesting criterion.
As convincingly argued by Beatty and Crawford (2010), this measure is particularly useful
11For matters of comparison between the intertemporal models, we did not include the kernel density
for the power of the static model. As already suggested in Table 2, this power density has most of its mass
around zero.
14Table 3: Distribution of predictive success
mean quartiles
min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
static 0.028 -0.999 0 0.026 0.167 0.607
life cycle
credit constrained 0.019 -0.823 -0.101 -0.051 -0.022 0.992
no credit constraints 0 -0.034 0 0 0 0
one lag habits
credit constrained 0.051 -0.99 0 0.15 0.32 0.876
no credit constraints -0.014 -0.572 -0.038 -0.022 -0.012 0.999
rational addiction
credit constrained 0.034 -0.991 0.013 0.048 0.112 0.533
no credit constraints 0.142 -0.874 -0.239 -0.149 0.712 0.984
in a revealed preference context, since predictive success can be directly calculated as the
dierence between the pass rate and 1 minus the power measure. As such, it is possible
to measure predictive success for every household separately (with the pass rate being
either 1 or 0), taking on values between  1 and 1. Negative values (i.e. low pass rate
together with low power) suggest the model is rather inadequate for describing observed
consumer behavior, since it is at least as good at explaining random behavior. On the other
hand, positive values (i.e. high pass rate together with high power) point to a potentially
useful model that is able to reject irrational behavior while explaining the actual observed
behavior. Table 3 presents the quartiles for the predictive success for all models, as a
counterpart of Table 2. We also give the mean predictive success across all households.
It appears that, based on Selten's criterion, the rational addiction model without credit
constraints provides, on average, the best t with a mean predictive success of 0:14, which
is signicantly larger than any of the other models. However, the quartile values reveal a
similarly good performance of the one lag habits model when we allow for borrowing con-
straints, which is not nested with the rational addiction model with no binding borrowing
constraints. To unravel these con
icting rst impressions, we will take a closer look at the
kernel densities of the predictive success estimates for all intertemporal models. For clarity
and comparison, Figure 4 shows the densities for the models with perfect capital markets,
and Figure 5 shows the models in the case where we allow for possible credit constraints.12
Figure 4 around here.
Figure 5 around here.
12Graphical results for the static model are again omitted. Predictive success for this model peaks highly
around 0, with a smaller peak at 0:2.
15We observe a high and narrow peak around zero for the life cycle model both with and
without credit constraints. This indicates that the consumption independence assumption
is too restrictive when imposed on a sample of tobacco addicted consumers. The one
lag habits model without credit constraints has a similar high peak around zero, and
a smaller peak close to 1 for the small set of households (2 percent) that is consistent
with this model. For the one-lag habits model which allows for borrowing constraints,
we observe a broad peak around the median level of 0:15, conrming that the departure
from perfect capital markets can be a useful extension of the standard approach. The
distribution of the rational addiction model without binding borrowing constraints has
one peak around  0:2 and another around 0:8. Hence, even under the strict assumption
of perfect capital markets, the rational addiction model manages to adequately capture
the rational behavior of a sizeable and identiable subset of households, with predictive
success values well beyond those of any of the other considered models.
In order to nd out whether there are (observable) individual characteristics that can
signicantly explain whether or not the individual is consistent with any specication of
the rational addiction model we estimated a probit model of the pass rate with respect to
several observable characteristics.13 Unfortunately, very few coecients were (statistically)
signicant. As a sole exception, we found that the pass rate of the rational addiction model
with credit constraints was signicantly and positively related to the age of the family head.
We do not have an intuitive explanation for this nding.14
Multiple addictive goods As a nal exercise, we considered an extension of the rational
addiction model that allows for multiple addictive goods. Considering our empirical setting,
we choose alcohol to be our second addictive good. The extension to two addictive goods
requires the introduction of a second stock of addiction Aa
t, for alcohol and a second
depreciation rate a. Denoting by Qa
t, the consumption of alcohol in period t, we obtain
the following `investment' equation.
A
a






Of course, the addition of a second addictive good requires an adjustment to the instan-
taneous utility function, which now has to take into account the negative in
uence of of
Aa
t on the level of utility. This utility function can be represented by u(qt;Qt;At;Qa
t;Aa
t).
We refer to appendix B for a statement of the necessary and sucient revealed preference
conditions for this more general model. Applying these conditions (under the assumption
of no credit constraints) to our data set15 gives us a pass rate of 0:94 and an average power
13Our data set provides information on age of the family head and age dierence with the other partner,
education and occupation of the family head, number of children in various age categories and housing
tenure. Detailed results from these estimates are available from the authors upon request.
14However, somewhat related, Chaloupka (1991) nds some evidence that younger and less educated
individuals tend to have a higher rate of time preference (i.e. a lower beta), implying they do not fully
internalize the future costs of current addictive consumption.
15We restricted our data set to households that have strict positive consumption for both alcohol and
tobacco for all eight observations. This restricts the sample to 137 households.
16of 0:061. The mean predictive success amounts to 0:001 which is very close to zero, mean-
ing that the inclusion of a second addictive good does not provide a better t (on average)
to the data set under consideration.
What can we learn from all this? First of all, our application shows that from an empirical
point of view, the rational addiction model and the habits model are much more realistic
than the standard life cycle model, which is strongly rejected for our data. In fact, for a
considerable subset of households, the rational addiction model (without credit constraints)
performs rather well. The adequacy of the specication may depend on specic household
characteristics. Unfortunately, our data did not allow us to identify which characteristics.
Second, from a more general perspective, we believe that our application convincingly
shows the practical usefulness of the revealed preference approach for assessing the validity
between several models of intertemporal decision making in a real life setting.
4 Conclusion
We developed a revealed preference methodology for assessing the validity of the rational
addiction model as it was introduced by Becker and Murphy (1988). By generalizing the
intertemporal consumption dependence underlying addictive behavior our revealed prefer-
ence characterization extends the life cycle model of Browning (1989) and the (one-lag)
habits model of Crawford (2010). Moreover, we relax the assumption of perfect capital
markets by allowing consumers to be credit constrained to some (unobserved) extent. We
applied our tests on a sample of Spanish households to look whether consumers addicted
to detrimental goods such as tobacco can still be considered as rational. The empirical
analysis shows that some intertemporal models are heavily rejected by the Spanish data
when intertemporal consumption externalities are not considered (i.e. the life cycle model).
When this assumption is relaxed and, additionally, the possibility of credit constraints is
introduced, we notice an improved empirical t of these more general models. We com-
plemented our analysis by calculating discriminatory power for the dierent models, and
nd that the high pass rates of the rational addiction model cannot be entirely attributed
to the generality or permissiveness of the rational addiction model, since the tests do not
lack in power. Based on the measure of predictive success that was suggested by Selten
(1991) and Beatty and Crawford (2010), we nd that an additional and nontrivial subset
of households can be rationalized by extending the life cycle and habits model towards the
more general rational addiction framework.
We see dierent avenues for follow-up research. First of all it might be possible to use
our framework to investigate which household characteristics drive the consistency with the
rational addiction model. However, this would require a data set with richer information
on household characteristics than the one we considered.
Second, in order to keep our application focused, we concentrated on characterizing
the revealed preference conditions and testing consistency of household data with these
conditions. This implies that we only considered 'sharp' rationality tests in the sense
that a given household passes the test, which means that the behavior is consistent with
17the model, or the model is rejected and the household is considered irrational. On the
other hand, Varian (1990) asserts this rather extreme notion could be attended to by
investigating to what extent a so-called irrational household is not a perfect optimizer, by
allowing for a small optimization error to enter the testable restrictions. The inclusion of
such optimization error into the rational addiction model could easily be done by modifying
condition (G.1).
Third, given that observed behavior is consistent with the rational addiction model, a
natural next question pertains to the recovery and identication of the underlying decision
model that rationalizes the observed behavior and to forecast behavior in new situations.
We refer to Crawford (2010) who investigated such issues in the case of the habits model.
Finally, future research could focus on relaxing several assumptions of our model. The
perfect foresight assumption, which maintained throughout this paper, is potentially too
restrictive when imposed over longer periods of time. Also, our model assumes that house-
hold behavior can be represented by the maximization of a single utility function. However,
most considered households from our empirical application consists of multiple individuals.
We leave it up to future research to extend our approach towards a setting that explicitly
allows for multiple (addicted) members within the same household.16
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A Proof of Theorem 1
(necessity) The function u is concave, hence for all t and v  T,




















are suitable subdierentials of
the function u(qv;Qv;Av). Together with the rst order conditions, this establishes the
necessity part.
(suciency) Consider a subset S of observations and sum condition (G.1) across all obser-
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:
This is a cyclical monotonicity condition (see Rockafellar, 1970, theorem 24.8). This
condition implies that there exists a concave utility function u, increasing in q and Q and






















Together with conditions (G.2)-(G.4), this gives conditions (A.1)-(A.5).
21B Revealed preference condition for multiple addic-
tive goods
The following presents the revealed preference characterization for the rational addiction
model with two addictive goods. We denote by P a
t the price of the second detrimental
addictive good and by Qa
t its quantity.
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent
 The data set D = frt;pt;Pt;P a
t ;qt;Qt;Qa
tgtT is rationalizable by the rational addic-
tion model with two addictive goods.
 There exist numbers ;;a 2]0;1] and for all t  T there exist positive numbers
ut;At;Aa
t, strict positive numbers e P
Q
t ; e P
Qa
t ;t and negative numbers e P A
t ; e P Aa
t such
that for all t;v  T,
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